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A distinguishing feature among households is whether adult members work or not, since
the occupational status of adults aﬀects their available time for home activities. Using
a survey method in two countries, Belgium and Germany, we provide household incomes
that retain the level of well-being across diﬀerent family types, distinguished by family size
and occupational status of adults. Our tests support that childcare-time costs are important
determinants of household well-being. Estimates of child costs relative to an adult are higher
for households that are time-constrained (all adults in the household work). Moreover, we
ﬁnd supportive evidence for the hypothesis that, in two-adult households, there is a potential
for within-household welfare gains from specialization in market- vs. domestic activities,
especially childcare.
Keywords: household production, child costs, childcare, survey method
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21. Introduction
In his survey of the role of children in understanding the economic behavior of households,
Browning (1992, p. 1470-1) noted:
“Every aspect of household economic behavior is signiﬁcantly correlated with the
presence of children in the household. [...] children [...] do play a central role in
understanding all facets of household economic behavior.”
A particular feature about the presence of children in a household is that they must
be raised by adults. So, childcare, the upbringing of children, is, unavoidably, a part of
the set of home-produced goods that require to invest considerable time and eﬀort. Yet,
the occupational status of adults inﬂuences the total available time for home activities. As
childcare is one of the most time-intensive home activities, non-trivial childcare-time costs
may be present as well.1 So, a reasonable question to raise is, “do households with working
adults face higher children costs?” In this study we focus on evaluating the link-up between
the occupational status of adults and the costs of children households face. Our study focuses
on estimating the tradeoﬀ between non-market-time losses and the family income required
to keep a household at the same level of well-being, as before the time loss. A particular
hypothesis we test is: “is the time/money tradeoﬀ higher in households with children vs.
families with no children?” Moreover, we estimate child costs relative to an adult in families
with working adults vs. families with non-working adults.
I no r d e rt oc o m eu pw i t he s t i m a t e so ft h et i m e / m o n e yt r a d e o ﬀf a c e db yd i ﬀ e r e n tf a m i l y
types, it is crucial to obtain household equivalent incomes, i.e. disposable family incomes that
make the well-being of households with diﬀerent demographic composition and occupational
1 See Gronau and Hamermesh (2006) on the time intensity of several home activities.
1status equal. We obtain equivalent incomes directly through a survey instrument. In our
survey we ask questions as: “which family-income level can make a household with one
working and one non-working adult with two children achieve the same well-being as a
household with a non-working single childless adult and a monthly family income of $1,000,
according to your opinion? What income do you suggest if in the previous question both
adults were non-working? And what if both adults were working?” The set of equivalent
i n c o m e sw eo b t a i n ,e n a b l e su st oc a l c u l a t ew e l f are-preserving time-loss compensations across
family types with the same demographic composition but diﬀerent occupational status.
For given variations of the occupational status of adults, we obtain estimates of aver-
age rates of substitution between time and money, that best capture the intensity of the
tradeoﬀ between time and money in diﬀerent family types. We focus on two broad types of
non-market time-endowment loss in families: (i) time losses where the occupational-status
variation of adults leads to a state where all adults in the household work full time, and (ii)
time losses where households of two non-working adults become a household of one working
and one non-working adult. For both types of time loss, (i) and (ii) above, we compare rates
of substitution between time and money in households with children vs. households without
children.
We conduct this survey in two countries, Belgium and Germany, and ﬁnd evidence that
the time/money tradeoﬀ increases in the presence of at least one child in all cases of a time-
loss type given by (i) above. In fact, for type-(i) time losses we ﬁnd that, in most cases, the
time/money tradeoﬀ increases in the presence of each additional child. In particular, for two-
adult households, when the time loss leads to two full-time working adults, the time-money
tradeoﬀ increases in the presence of each additional child in all cases. On the contrary, for
type-(ii) time losses the eﬀect of the presence of children on the time/money tradeoﬀ faced
2by two-adult households is either insigniﬁcant or slightly positive. We also estimate child
costs relative to an adult, after controlling for household economies of scale in consumption
along the dimension of household size. Consistently with our results above, we ﬁnd that
child costs are higher in time-constrained families.
Our results point out promising directions to be followed in the ﬁeld of family- and
labor economics. First, childcare seems to be a very important determinant of household
choices and well-being, and our results indicate that theoretical models should be stressing
childcare-time costs explicitly. Second, our results indicate that households with one non-
working and one working adult may exploit an ability to obtain welfare gains through the
specialization of one adult in domestic activities (such as childcare) and of the other adult
in market activities. To our knowledge, Apps and Rees (2002) is the only existing study
addressing these two modeling directions explicitly.
The reason we have chosen a survey instrument of direct questions is the diﬃculties faced
by studies that use theoretical models in order to elicit similar information from available
data. Existing studies that pursue the estimation (and explanation) of child costs and
equivalent incomes of households, face the particular diﬃculty that the set of prices of home
activities as well as the quantities of domestic inputs and outputs is not completely available
(a subset of unobservables is diﬃcult to obtain). A considerable eﬀort to collect data on the
domestic input “allocation of time on home activities” is time-use surveys.2 But even if all
2 However, a connection between time allocated to home activities and the intermediate market goods used
in home production is still not provided by the data. We quote Gronau and Hamermesh (2006, p.3) on this
issue:
“Regrettably, no single data set anywhere in the world meets the ideal: information from time
budgets on how household members spend all their time [...] and records of the same households’
purchases of goods and services.”
Nevertheless, time-use surveys are a very useful piece of information that ﬁrst appeared in Bloch (1973)
and Gronau (1976), while a book summarizing recent results on time use is Hamermesh and Pfann (2005).
Moreover, Gronau and Hamermesh (2001) present time-use data across six countries and provide several facts
about time use and activity diversity across educational levels. Examples of studies that utilize time-use
3inputs to domestic production were available, the household-production technologies remain
unspeciﬁed. And in the plausible case where time devoted to childcare generates direct
utility, even if household-production technologies with tractable properties (e.g., constant
returns to scale) are assumed, the overall level of domestic output is unknown.3 This means
that, for a given utility function it is not possible to compute the price of domestic output,
so the price vector for computing equivalent incomes is not completely available. Thus, it
is diﬃcult to establish that estimates of equivalent income/expenditure functions and child
costs that are deduced from theoretical models are unbiased.4 So, a central contribution of
our study is that we suggest a way to estimate equivalent incomes directly.
Our survey can provide a useful piece of new information in addition to this of databases
on consumption expenditures (and prices), labor supply (and wages), and time use. The new
database we provide is not intended to substitute for the use of models or other databases
in labor studies, or studies in family economics. Typically, models suggest mechanisms of
rational choice that can explain observed choices, but always imply an ordering of well-being
across households (driven by indirect utility functions) that is unobservable. Our survey
elicits such an ordering of well-being and matching this ordering can serve as a criterion
for specifying more reliable models. In this way databases from our survey can serve as a
useful step, a complement to both econometric-demand system approaches and to calibration
approaches to applied issues in these ﬁelds. Another important aspect is that hypotheses
underlying the building of theoretical models that are not testable a-priori can be tested
using data from our survey.
data in their analyses include Apps and Rees (2002) and Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003).
3 Home-production technologies with constant returns to scale is a simplifying direction pointed out early
on by Pollak and Wachter (1975) in cases where there is not “joint production,” i.e. when work at home
does not generate direct utility.
4 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for elucidating this point to us.
4In Section 2 we explain the structure of our survey and our samples. In Section 3 we ana-
lyze the time/money tradeoﬀs faced in diﬀerent family types with emphasis on a comparison
of families with children vs. families without children. In Section 4 we provide estimates of
child costs relative to an adult in families with diﬀerent non-market time endowments, while
in Section 5 we suggest applications and extensions. Section 6 summarizes our conclusions.
2. Survey structure and samples
Our survey consists of three sections, all appearing in the appendix. In the ﬁrst section we
give information to the respondents about the topic in question and we explain the task
they are asked to perform. In the second section we ask our respondents to state some of
their personal characteristics that could possibly be related to their assessments of the role
of household time allocations for well-being.
The third section contains the core questions of our survey. We provide our subjects with
a table of 20 entries, each corresponding to a family type distinguished according to three
dimensions, namely, (i) the number of adults, (ii) the number of children in the household,
and, (iii) the occupational status of adults. Moving downwards within each column of the
table, we increase the number of children (from zero to three children). Moving within rows
from left to right, we increase the number of adults, from one to two adults, and we also
vary the occupational status of these adults between non-working and working full time.5
Denoting a non-working adult by “N” and a full-time working adult by “W,” the sequence
5 The terms “working” and “non-working” indicate whether individuals work full-time in the market or
not. So, even if an individual is putting eﬀort in home activities it is called, by convention, “non-working.”
On another note, in a previous version of this paper (see Koulovatianos, Schröder and Schmidt (2005b))
we have used the English terms “Employed” for “Working” and “Unemployed” for “Non-working.” As we
explain below, we have not conducted our survey in English-speaking countries. Had we done so, the English
term “unemployed” might have given a negative signal to respondents and might have biased the results.
So, we have avoided using the term “Unemployed” in this version of the paper. In conducting the survey
in Germany and Belgium for this paper, we used the equivalent of “non-working” (“nicht-erwerbstätig” in
German and “niet werkend” in Dutch). We are indebted to Martin Browning for raising this objection for
5from left to right is, “N, W, NN, WN, WW.” Each child is denoted by “C,” so, “WNCCC”
is a household with two adults, one working and one non-working, and three children. We
tell our respondents to consider that adults are individuals of age 35 to 55, and that children
a r eo fa g e7t o1 1 .
In the ﬁrst entry of the table we provide the after-tax monthly income of a reference
household, a non-working single childless adult. All the remaining 19 entries are empty, and
our subjects are asked to ﬁll them in with after-tax monthly family incomes that bring all
households to the same level of well-being as this of the reference household. We provide
our subjects with two more tables of the same structure, with the sole diﬀerence that the
reference income of the reference household is diﬀerent. The three levels are deﬁned as
follows: the lowest reference income is the absolute poverty line (deﬁned by the social-
security beneﬁt for single-childless adults in both Belgium and Germany, about 500 Euros)
and we add increments of three poverty lines for each next income category (that deﬁnes
a level of well-being). Our selection of reference-income increments matches approximately
the bottom-, middle-, and top income-distribution quintile in both countries.6
Our samples consist of 149 respondents in Belgium and 164 in Germany. The question-
naire appeared on the internet and was advertised through web newslette r si nb o t hc o u n t r i e s .
Each respondent was oﬀered the right to participate in a lottery with expected payoﬀ equal
to 5 Euros. The Belgian sample was collected in April 2002, whereas the German sample in
the English term that we used in the previous version of the paper.
6 Both Belgium and Germany had similar per-capita incomes and personal-income distributions at the time
of sampling. The social-security beneﬁt for an unemployed single childless adult was 523 Euros in Belgium
in 2002 (see the database “MISSOC (Mutual Information System on Social Protection in the Member States
of the Eurpean Union)” provided by EUROSTAT). According to the Regulation of Compensation Rules
and to the 12th Book of the Social Welfare Code in Germany (Regelsatzverordnung (2004) and Sozialgeset-
zbuch - SGBXII (2004)), the unemployment beneﬁt for a single childless adult was between 282-297 Euros
in Germany in 2004. According to the Law of Housing Beneﬁts (Wohngeldgesetz (2004) - paragraph 2)
compensations for housing vary according to personal and family characteristics. A plausible estimate for
single-adult housing in 2004 is 200 Euros. Therefore, the total 2004 beneﬁts in Germany were about 500
Euros. We interpret this total amount as the poverty line.
6February 2005. Table 1 presents a breakdown of the sample statistics for both countries.
The gender distribution of Germany is biased towards having more male respondents. In
both countries, most respondents come from the age bracket of 20-40 years old and they are
highly educated. These biases might be explained by the structure of internet users.7 In a
previous paper with similar welfare-evaluation questions (see Koulovatianos, Schröder and
Schmidt (2005a)), we have found no compelling evidence that personal characteristics or
the survey medium (written vs. internet) bias the resulting estimates of equivalent incomes.
Therefore, possible sampling biases are not expected to be a burden in eliciting credible
information about the inter-household comparisons of well-being.8
3. Equivalent-income proﬁles and the tradeoﬀ between time and
money in families with children
Table 2 gives a comprehensive summary of our results, by presenting the sample means of the
stated equivalent incomes. An immediate observation is that respondents always compensate
households for their loss in non-market time endowment or for their labor-market eﬀort. This
is a plausible result, consistent with predictions by any documented theory of the value of
time, at least to our knowledge. In this section we present some information that can be
7 For example, according to the annual publication of the Elections Research Group in Germany for year 2004
(Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2004)), most internet users are male (about 58%), highly educated and people
above the age 50 are under-represented. Couper (2000), discusses four sources of error in web-based surveys:
(i) coverage error (a mismatch between the target population and the frame population), (ii) sampling error
(non-representativeness within the frame population), (iii) nonresponse error (unwillingness or inability to
respond), and (iv) measurement error (arising from low motivation of respondents to put the required eﬀort
or imperfections of the presentation means of the survey). Errors (ii) to (iv) arise also in non-web-based
surveys and they can be minimized through careful survey design and eﬃcient advertisement of the survey
and by oﬀering appropriate participation incentives.
8 See also section 4.2, p. 989 in Koulovatianos, Schröder and Schmidt (2005a) for evidence that even the levels
of well-being of respondents do not inﬂuence signiﬁcantly their evaluations of income needs of hypothetical
households with welfare diﬀerent from this of the respondents. This ﬁnding also supports that the use of
a “small” sample of respondents is not a burden for estimating equivalent incomes. A “small” sample of
respondents that provide reliable information about many hypothetical households is able to generate a large
number of observations that is appropriate for statistical inference.
7conveyed directly from equivalent-income proﬁles and we test the hypothesis that families
with children face a stronger tradeoﬀ between time and money.
3.1 The tradeoﬀ between time and money across diﬀerent family
types
Figures 1.a and 1.b depict the information given in Table 2. The horizontal axis of each
graph captures the dimension of ah o u s e h o l d ’ sa v a i l a b l et i m ee n d o w m e n t .I np a r t i c u l a r ,t h e
value “1” on the horizontal axis represents the case where all adults in the household are
non-working. The value “0” on the horizontal axis represents the case where all adults in the
household work full time. In the case of two-adult households where one adult is working
and the other is non-working, the corresponding value on the horizontal axis is “0.5.” Each
dot (also represented by the symbols “, , , •”t od i s t i n g u i s ha m o n gf a m i l yt y p e sw i t h
a diﬀerent number of children) gives an average equivalent income, one for each case of
household characteristics, taken from Table 2.
F o re x a m p l e ,c o n s i d e rt h ee n t r y“ WN, yr =5 0 0 , nC =2 ” for Belgium in Table 2. This
gives an average equivalent income of 1614.35 Euros for a couple with two children where one
adult is working and the other is not working, for the reference income of 500 Euros. This
entry is displayed by the triangle “” which is in the middle of the line named “2 children”
on the graph “Couples, poor (500 Euros)” in Figure 1.a.
For any given family type presented in Figures 1.a and 1.b the average equivalent incomes
that correspond to a reduction in available non-market time are connected by a solid line.
The fact that all solid lines in Figures 1.a and 1.b are downward sloping implies that, in
both countries, for any given family type, a decrease in available non-market time always
requires a positive income compensation. The slope of each solid line can be interpreted
as a rate of substitution between non-market time endowments and household disposable
8income, capturing and quantifying the trade-oﬀ between time and money for each family
type. Yet, some remarks must be made about these estimated rates of substitution.
First, the slopes of the solid lines in Figure 1 should not be interpreted as estimated rates
of substitution between consumption expenditures and leisure implied by indiﬀerence curves
of structural household utility functions. Instead, the time/money tradeoﬀ estimated by the
slopes of the solid lines of Figure 1 originates from household indirect utility functions.T h i s
distinction should be emphasized, since our questions pertain evaluations of relationships
between incomes, non-market time endowments and household well-being, contingent upon
potential real-life choices made by hypothetical households. The questionnaire leaves the
respondent free to think about potential chosen consumer baskets, even education decisions
for children, for a given economic environment, prices and quality of goods in a certain
location.9 So, if, for example, the price vector changes, the estimates of rates of substitution
between time and money should change as well. A second remark is that Figure 1 does
not, and cannot, provide information about marginal rates of substitution between time
endowments and incomes.
T h ew a ye a c hg r a p hi ss t r u c t u r e di nF i g u r e1e n a b l e st ov i s u a l i z eak e ya s p e c to fo u r
study, namely welfare-preserving compensations of each additional child for a given number
and occupational status of adults in a household. By ﬁxing a non-market time endow-
9 Of course, we anticipate that respondents project some of the choices that they would make themselves
under the hypothetical conditions given by our questionnaire. The sole proviso for eliciting credible informa-
tion through these questionnaires is that respondents are rational and well-informed, the basic assumption
underlying rational-choice models. We speculate that respondents are “well-trained” experts in making rea-
sonable assessments, since they have been planning on their overall budget allocations, often keeping their
home balance sheets, routinely in their everyday lives. A typical source of doubt about the eﬃciency of
our approach comes from the fact that respondents examine hypothetical household setups that typically
diﬀer from their own and often from the history of household setups they have belonged to in the past.
In Koulovatianos, Schröder and Schmidt (2005a, p. 989), where we have used a similar survey instrument
to estimate household economies of scale, we have tested the ability of respondents to provide comparisons
among family types with living standards diﬀerent from their own, and we have found that respondents
perform this task satisfactorily well.
9ment (a choice of values 0, 1, or 0.5 -whenever 0.5 is applicable- on the horizontal axis)
and projecting a line upwards, welfare-preserving compensations for each additional child
can be distinguished on each graph of Figure 1. This can be done by comparing the dis-
tances between consecutive dots (average equivalent incomes) at any given non-market time
endowment.
3.2 The time/money tradeoﬀ in families with children
Do rates of substitution between non-market time and money diﬀer in the presence of children
for a given number of adults in a household? A way to visualize an answer to this question is
to compare the slope of the solid line of a childless household with this of all other households
in each graph of Figure 1. In Figure 1, dashed curves are the equivalent-income functions
of the childless households, appearing at the bottom of each graph, shifted in a (piecewise)
parallel way.
Figure 1 shows that the solid lines are steeper than the dashed lines for all families with
one adult and children. This indicates that the rate of substitution between available non-
market time and disposable family income is higher in single-adult households with children,
compared to single-childless adult households. This pattern can be seen in both countries,
and at all levels of well-being. In brief, for single adult households, the time/money tradeoﬀ
becomes stronger in the presence of children.
The pattern of time/money tradeoﬀs in families with children vs. families without chil-
dren is more subtle in two-adult households. In particular, the shifts in time/money tradeoﬀs
when children are added to single-adult families are the same in two-adult families only when
the non-market time loss pertains a transition from a “WN” household type to a “WW”
household type. When the non- m a r k e tt i m el o s sp e r t a i n satransition from “NN” house-
hold types to “WN” household types, the dashed lines are close, hardly distinguishable from
10the solid lines in some cases. This is an indication that when two-adult households with
two non-working adults shift to a “traditional” household type (“WN”),10 the time/money
tradeoﬀ is unaﬀected by the presence of children.
Table 3 presents signiﬁcance tests for the time/money-tradeoﬀ patterns that can be seen
in Figure 1. Each entry of Table 3 is a welfare-preserving time-loss compensation. The
symbols “W − N”, “WN − NN”a n d“ WW − WN” denote the three types of time loss.
For example, all entries under “WW−WN” refer to time-loss compensations that pertain a
two-adult household that switches from an occupational status “WN”t ot h es t a t u s“ WW.”
E a c he n t r yu n d e rag i v e nt y p eo ft i m el o s sp e r t a i n sah o u s e h o l dt y p ew i t hag i v e nn u m b e ro f
children. For example, the entry under “WW−WN”w i t h“ nC =2 ” gives the compensation
for a two-adult household with two children that switches from “WN”t o“ WW”. For each
such compensation we state the sample mean, median, and standard error. To see the link-
u pb e t w e e nT a b l e s2a n d3 ,t h ee n t r y“ WW − WN, yr =5 0 0 , nC =2 ”i nT a b l e3 a( w h e r e
the mean is equal to 400.44) is the diﬀerence between the entries “WW, yr =5 0 0 , nC =2 ”
(=2014.79) and “WN, yr =5 0 0 , nC =2 ” (=1614.35), for Belgium in Table 2.
It is transparent that entries of Table 3 (sample means) capture slopes of solid lines in
Figure 1. To test the statistical signiﬁcance of diﬀerences in slopes whenever children are
added to a household, it suﬃces to compare entries of Table 3 for families with diﬀerent
n u m b e r so fc h i l d r e n .F o re a c hl e v e lo fw e l l - b eing in Table 3, at the bottom and in-between
each two consecutive columns of descriptive statistics, appears a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test
statistic and its p-value. The fact that a Wilcoxon test statistic appears in-between two
particular columns indicates that it tests diﬀerences in the data of these two columns. So,
10The term “traditional household” was coined by Apps and Rees (1999, 2002), in their analyses of taxation
of couples and childcare time costs. In Apps and Rees (2002, p. 624) the “traditional household” consists of
a full-time working adult and an adult “[...] usually a female [...]”, who “[...] works hardly at all outside the
home [...]”. We emphasize that in our questionnaire we do not assign genders to hypothetical adult members
for “WN” household types (or any other households).
11these Wilcoxon tests pertain the change in compensations for time losses in households that
diﬀer by the presence of one child. Notice that this is a stronger test than comparing the
slopes of solid lines vs. slopes of dashed lines in Figure 1. The Wilcoxon tests in Table 3
compare time-loss compensations for each additional child between two family types. The
reason we have used Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests and not pairwise t-tests is that normality
is not guaranteed for the errors of the sample means, as this can be seen by the descriptive
statistics presented in Table 3.11 Since the observations appearing in entries of Table 3 are
not independent (they come from the same sample of respondents and the same survey) the
Wilcoxon tests we present in Table 3 take the diﬀerences in time-loss compensations stated
by each individual and test them against a 0-value null hypothesis.
The results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks tests reveal a striking pattern of time/money
tradeoﬀs in diﬀerent family types. For time losses that stem from the occupational-status
variations “W −N”a n d“ WW−WN,” in all cases and in both countries, the time/money
tradeoﬀ becomes stronger in the presence of the ﬁrst child. This is consistent with the
picture seen in Figure 1, based on the comparison between the slopes of solid lines named
“1 child” and the slopes of dashed lines for all time losses corresponding to “W − N”a n d
“WW − WN,” and for all levels of well-being. In fact, Table 3 shows that in most cases
and in both countries, the time/money tradeoﬀ becomes stronger in the presence of each
additional child, beyond the ﬁrst child, for these time losses.
On the contrary, time/money tradeoﬀs corresponding to time losses that stem from the
occupational-status variation “WN − NN,” barely change by the presence of children. As
it can be seen in Table 3, for time-loss types “WN − NN,” in Belgium it is only two out
of nine cases where additional children mildly aﬀect this tradeoﬀ, whereas in Germany the
11In a previous version of this paper, Koulovatianos, Schröder and Schmidt (2005b, Table 3), we also pre-
sented pairwise t-tests and the results are in accordance with the results of Wilcoxon tests presented in the
current version.
12corresponding tradeoﬀs are mildly aﬀected in about half of the cases. These results reconﬁrm
the message given by the comparison between solid lines and dashed lines in Figure 1.
To summarize our results so far, we have found evidence that the time/money tradeoﬀ
increases in the presence of at least one child in all cases where the occupational-status
variation of adults leads to a state where all adults work full time (either “W − N”o r
“WW − WN” time-loss types). In particular, for these types of time loss, the presence of
each additional child makes the time/money tradeoﬀ stronger. With respect to the time loss
borne when households of two non-working adults (“NN”) become “traditional” (“WN”),
the eﬀect of the presence of children on the time/money tradeoﬀ faced by these households
is either insigniﬁcant or slightly positive. Most interestingly in two-adult households that
face the time-loss type “WW − WN, ”t h et e s t so fT a b l e3i n d i c a t et h a tt h et i m e - m o n e y
tradeoﬀ increases in the presence of each additional child in all cases.
These results suggest that all time-constrained households bear higher children costs.
The only exception is the “traditional household type” (“WN”), where welfare-preserving
compensations for children seem to be about the same as in household types “NN.”
One plausible explanation for our results can be provided by the time component of child
costs (childcare-time costs). In particular, according to Gronau and Hamermesh (2006, p.
5, Table 1), based on US and Israeli data, besides sleep, childcare is the second most time-
intensive activity after leisure.12 Apps and Rees (2002) stress thei m p o r t a n c eo fc h i l d c a r e
based on an Australian time use survey and provide an analysis for re-examining child costs
after including considerations about childcare time.
If childcare is time-intensive, then, in the presence of children, the time-loss compensa-
tions needed when the time loss leads to low non-market time endowments is likely to be
12Sleep is assumed to have inﬁnite time intensity in Gronau and Hemermesh (2006). For an extensive study
on the cross-country empirical facts and the economics of sleep see Biddle and Hamermesh (1990).
13higher. Such high time-loss compensations could arise because time-constrained parents may
need to “outsource” for childcare services, i.e. to buy childcare services from the market. For
our ﬁnding that time-loss compensations increase in the presence of each additional child,
t h ef a c tt h a ta na d u l tc a nt a k ec a r eo fm o r et h a no n ec h i l d r e na tt h es a m et i m e( e c o n o m i e s
of scale in the domestic production of childcare) could oﬀer an explanation. The cost of
outsourcing in the market for childcare activities would rise with the number of children.
A consistent conjecture can be made for our ﬁnding that, in two-adult households, when
the time loss leads to a “traditional” household type (“WN−NN”), the time-loss compen-
sations are not aﬀected by the presence of children. In the case of traditional households,
“outsourcing” for childcare services may not be as necessary, as childcare-time costs may be
borne by the non-working adult who specializes in home activities. Specialization possibili-
ties in “WN” family types allow the non-working partner to devote more time for childcare,
and the household does not incur a higher loss in well-being due to the presence of more
children.
So far we have tested hypotheses that address the comparison of time/money tradeoﬀs in
households with children vs. families without children qualitatively. Our database enables us
to move to a second step without the use of a prior theory to address the data: to estimate
child costs relative to an adult after controlling for some important eﬀects, such as household
economies of scale in consumption in multi-member families.13 In fact, the analysis of the
present section serves as a guide for specifying the regressions of the section that follows,
that undertakes the estimation of child costs. The goals of the section that follows are two:
13Yet, we must stress that a quantitative analysis of child costs without theory is far from complete. Without
a theoretical model, estimates of child costs cannot be explained adequately. Such a connection of our
database with a theoretical model is beyond the scope of our present analysis. Nevertheless, our database
enables to measure child costs without providing a rigorous explanation of the results. What is important
about the analysis that follows is the distinction of child costs in time-constrained vs. non-time constrained
households.
14(i) to address child costs quantitatively and to distinguish child costs in time-constrained
households vs. non-time-constrained households, and (ii) to test whether the results of the
present section are robust to controlling for other aspects that inﬂuence household choices,
such as household economies of scale in consumption.
4. Estimates of child costs relative to an adult
In order to estimate child costs relative to an adult it is important to control for economies of
scale in household consumption/production along the dimension of household size. House-
hold economies of scale might stem from the potential that members of multi-person house-
holds have, for example, to share within-household public goods.
The requirement that child costs are estimated relative to an adult, necessitates the use
of ratios of equivalent incomes. We build on the logic of Banks and Johnson (1994), who
suggest a formalization for measuring household economies of scale and children costs relative
to an adult from equivalent-income ratios.14 Banks and Johnson (1994) use the formula,
EIR =( nA + α · nC)
θ ,
with EIR being the equivalent-income ratios, nA being the number of adults in the house-
hold, nC being the number of children, α being the cost of a child relative to an adult, while
θ can be seen as a “catch-all” parameter, controlling for economies of scale in both household
consumption and production. It would be expected that θ t a k e sv a l u e sb e t w e e n0 and 1.O f
course, the lower the estimate of parameter θ, the higher the economies of scale.
We extend this approach by including the costs of non-market time-endowment losses.
We specify a regression as follows,
14Equivalent-income ratios are called “relative equivalence scales.” This term usually appears in literatures




nA + αy · nC + βy · nW
θy + by · PERSONAL i + ei,y .( 1 )
By EIRi,y we denote respondent “i’s” stated equivalent income divided by the reference
income. The reference income is the income, “y,” of the non-working single childless adult.
So, the costs of children we estimate are relative to a non-working adult. The variable nA
is the number of adults, nC is the number of children, and nW is the number of working
adults in the household. So, nA, nW,a n dnC deﬁne the household type. As in the Banks-
Johnson (1994) speciﬁcation, parameter θy captures and controls for economies of scale in
household consumption and production at reference income y.P a r a m e t e rβy is the time-loss
compensation relative to the cost of a non-working adult, after controlling for household
economies of scale at reference income y. Parameter αy then gives the costs of children
relative to a non-working adult, after controlling for household economies of scale and time-
loss compensations at reference income y. PERSONALi is a set of conditioning variables
that comprise the personal characteristics of respondent i, listed in Table 1. Finally, ei,y is
the error term.
In Koulovatianos, Schröder and Schmidt (2005a, p. 974, Table 2), in regressions using
the speciﬁcation EIR =( nA + α · nC)
θ, we found that both parameters, θ and α,f a l la s
the living standard, captured by the reference income, increases. This means that at a
higher level of well-being (higher reference income), the within-household sharing potential
is higher, and equivalent-income ratios and children costs relative to an adult are lower. For
this reason, we allow all coeﬃcients (i.e., αy, βy,θy,a n dby, here, and all other coeﬃcients
introduced in other regression speciﬁcation sb e l o w ) ,t ov a r yw i t hr e f e r e n c ei n c o m e ,y.T h u s ,
we run a separate regression for each reference income in order to control for the eﬀects of
well-being on equivalent-income ratios.
16The regression results of speciﬁcation (1) can be found in the columns “Spec. 1” in Tables
4a and 4b. In both countries and for all reference incomes, we can see that αy is lower than
βy. This means that, relative to a non-working adult, the time-loss compensation of an
adult for full-time work is greater than the cost of a child. Moreover, as in Koulovatianos,
Schröder and Schmidt (2005a), the estimators ˆ αy and ˆ θy fall with reference income as well.15
In the previous section we provided evidence that time-loss compensations are higher in
the presence of children, in the cases where the time-loss types lead the household to an
occupational status where all adults wo r k( i . e . ,w h e nh o u s e h o l d sb e c o m e“ W”o r“ WW”).
If such an eﬀect is present and robust, the speciﬁcation given by (1) does not allow to
distinguish it in the evaluation of child costs. For this reason, we introduce a new regression
speciﬁcation that extends (1), given by,
ESi,y =

nA + αy · nC + βy · nW + γy · nC · DWN + δy · nC · DF
θy +
+by · PERSONAL i + ei,y .( 2 )
The diﬀerence between (2) and (1) is that we have introduced two dummy variables, “DWN”
and “DF,” that interact with nC, i.e. with the presence of children. The dummy DF takes the
value 1 if it refers to household types “W”a n d“ WW,” i.e. households where all adults work
full time (notice that the symbol we have chosen, “DF,” captures the concept of full time-
endowment loss). If the coeﬃcient δy (on nC · DF) is positive and signiﬁcant, then children
costs should be higher in these (highly) time-constrained family types. On the contrary, in
15This property, that the rich exhibit a higher ability to share (the richer have a lower ˆ θy), has received
recent theoretical attention and empirical support. In particular, Donaldson and Pendakur (2004) suggest
that demand systems characterized by a property they name “Generalized Equivalence Scale Exactness
(GESE)” outperform previous demand systems and provide evidence that equivalence scales (EIR’s) fall
with rising income in Canada. Donaldson and Pendakur (2006) introduce a new property for demand
systems, “Generalized Absolute Equivalence Scale Exactness (GAESE),” according to which scales can fall
with income if households face ﬁxed costs of family-type characteristics, and they provide new evidence from
Canada that this is, indeed, the case.
17the previous section we found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that in “traditional”
two-adult households, “WN,” it is possible that the non-working adult undertakes childcare,
saving part of this cost for the household. In order to test this hypothesis after controlling
for all other eﬀects, we introduce the dummy variable “DWN,” that takes the value 1 if
the family type is “WN.” So, if the coeﬃcient γy (on nC · DWN) is not diﬀerent from 0,
then this would be supportive evidence that in “traditional” households childcare-time costs
c a nb eb o r n eb yt h en o n - w o r k i n ga d u l tw h om a ys p ecialize in child-related home activities.
In Tables 4a and 4b, the results of the regression speciﬁcation given by (2) are presented
in columns “Spec. 2.” Indeed, γy is insigniﬁcant in all cases, whereas δy is positive and
signiﬁcant, with the sole exception of Belgium for the highest reference income.
The regression results of speciﬁcation (2) suggest that the specialization potential for
childcare in household types “WN”l e a d st og a i n si nt e r m so fw e l l - b e i n gi nt h e s eh o u s e h o l d
types. It is plausible to think that “WN” family types possess specialization potential for
more home activity types than childcare.16 This specialization advantage of “WN”m a yn o t
be present when switching from “WN”t o“ WW” (or from “N”t o“ W”), because of the
narrowing in the ability to produce at home. We modify the speciﬁcation given by (2), in
order to control for specialization in home activities other than childcare, using,
ESi,y =

nA + αy · nC + γy · nC · DWN + δy · nC · DF + ζy · nA · DWN + ηy · nA · DF
θy +
+by · PERSONAL i + ei,y .(3)
If there is signiﬁcant specialization in the household, this speciﬁcation given by (3) should
16A strand of literature suggests a within-household Ricardian-trade type of home-production model, where
adults specialize in market and non-market production activities according to comparative advantage. This
literature was originated by Apps (1981, 1982), Apps and Jones (1986) and continued in a number of
applications by Apps and Rees (1988, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2002). In all these papers, the working hypothesis is
that there can be gains from trade of home-production inputs between the two adults. Apps (2003), provides
a survey of this line of work.
18also imply that ζy is smaller than ηy, providing a diﬀerent set of controlling variables for
estimating child costs. Tables 4a and 4b show (columns “Spec. 3”) that this is the case.
Last, extending the sensitivity analysis, to distinguish among all household types, us-
i n gt w oe x t r ad u m m i e s ,“ DW” corresponding to single-adult households where the adult is




nA + αy · nC + γy · nC · DWN + ζy · nA · DWN + ϕy · nC · DW + χy · nC · DWW+
+ψy · nA · DW + ωy · nA · DWW
θy + by · PERSONAL i + ei,y.( 4 )
Consistently with our previous ﬁndings about the specialization hypothesis, the estimates
of (4) in Tables 4a and 4b (columns “Spec. 4”) reveal that, generally, ζy is smaller than ψy
and ωy. Again, children are more costly in households where all adults are working.
In Tables 4a and 4b all reported estimates are controlled for the respondents’ personal
characteristics. However, we do not report the estimates of the vector by. Although the
inclusion of personal characteristics adds some explanatory power to the regressions (it
increases ¯ R2), it does not alter the levels of the reported estimates. We found no personal
characteristic that is either robust or preserving its sign across all reference incomes for each
speciﬁcation.17
Tables 4a and 4b provide the opportunity to derive children costs from all coeﬃcients that
are linked with the presence of children in the household, and to have a direct assessment
of relative children costs from our survey. In Table 5 we present a summary of the ranges
of children costs that are taken from the columns “Spec. 4” of Table 4, given that this
regression speciﬁcation controls for specialization eﬀects, both with respect to childcare and
17The estimates of personal characteristics can be provided by the authors upon request.
19with respect to all other home activities. In particular, we present estimates for two-adult
households, “WN” versus “WW” households, in order to compare our results with these of
Apps and Rees (2002). Two important ﬁndings conveyed by Table 5 are that relative child
costs are higher in “WW” family types compared to “WN,” and that relative child costs
fall as reference income increases.
In Table 5 we also state the Apps and Rees (2002) estimates. In Apps and Rees (2002,
see p. 645), the sum of childcare purchased goods, home production for children and child-
care time costs, sums to about 78% to 98% of the total consumption of an adult male.
These numbers are higher compared to ours. This diﬀerence may be due to the particular
assumptions on sharing rules and on the nature of the home-production functions that Apps
and Rees (2002) make in order to allow for a ‘smooth’ estimation process through a demand
system that also matches time-use data. The additional hypotheses of joint production pos-
sibilities and scale economies with respect to childcare time, must be a plausible direction
to follow and a natural extension of the analysis of Apps and Rees (2002).
5. Suggested extensions
The available micro-level databases that scholars in labor and family economics use, consist
of three parts: (i) consumption-expenditure data and prices, (ii) labor-supply data and
wages, and (iii) time-use survey data. Studies that rely upon theoretical models in order to
estimate household-production functions, labor-supply decisions, child costs and equivalent-
income functions often face identiﬁcation problems. A typical example is the identiﬁcation of
a household-production function. With information limited to data (i)-(iii) above, quantities
and prices of home-produced commodities must be inferred implicitly by a model. Since
early on, Pollak and Wachter (1975) have stressed the strong restrictions required in order
20to separate implicit commodity prices from household preferences, household-production
technologies and market prices. In particular, the Pollak and Wachter (1975) restrictions
include that household-production technologies exhibit constant returns to scale and that
there is no joint production. Little progress has been made since the Pollak-Wachter (1975)
critique. For example, Gronau (1977) suggested that home commodities and market goods
are perfect substitutes. But as Gronau (2006, p.10) notes,
“The ‘price’ Gronau [(1977)] had to pay for attaining identiﬁcation of the home
production function was giving up on the estimation of [...] the utility component
associated with work at home. This shortcoming seems particularly disturbing in
the case of childcare.”
Graham and Green (1984) and Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003) suggest some solutions to
the restrictions pointed out by Pollak and Wachter (1975), that allow for the identiﬁcation
of household production functions, but they impose other restrictions. Such identiﬁcation
problems pertain both the estimation of econometric demand systems and the calibration
approach of macroeconomists, as Gronau (2006) explains in detail.18
We must emphasize that the database we provide is not intended to substitute for the use
of models or other databases in labor studies. The role of our survey is that it can provide a
useful piece of information (direct estimates of household equivalent incomes), in addition
to this of databases (i)-(iii) above, so as to facilitate the speciﬁcation of models that aim
at explaining several issues in family- and labor economics. One new promising direction of
research is studies using matching models such as these of Aiyagari, Greenwood and Güner
(2000), Greenwood, Güner and Knowles (2000) and Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu
18Such studies include, Benhabib et al. (1991), Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), Greenwood et al. (1995),
McGrattan et al. (1997), Einarsson and Marquis (1997), Ingram et al. (1997), Perli (1998), Parente et al.
(2000), Campbell and Ludvingson (2001), Gomme et al. (2001), Gollin et al. (2004) and others.
21(2005), that look at marriage decisions, social security or the long-run development of labor-
supply (especially female-labor participation). Our study’s survey can be particularly useful
for this line of work, as we provide equivalent incomes for a wide variety of household types
and at diﬀerent levels of well-being.
6. Conclusion
We implemented a survey method that can provide direct estimates of equivalent incomes
(welfare-preserving disposable family incomes) among diﬀerent family types that also vary
according to the available non-market time of adults in a household. One can distinguish
two broad types of non-market time-endowment loss in families: (i) time losses where the
occupational-status variation of adults leads to a state where all adults in the household
work full time, and (ii) time losses where households of two non-working adults become a
household of one working and one non-working adult (“traditional household”). Welfare-
preserving compensations for such time losses capture rates of substitution between time
and money, the time/money tradeoﬀ faced by diﬀerent family types. We conducted this
survey in two countries, Belgium and Germany, and, for both types of time loss, (i) and (ii)
above, we compared the time/money tradeoﬀ, in households with children vs. households
without children. We found evidence that the time/money tradeoﬀ increases in the presence
of at least one child in all cases of a time-loss type given by (i) above. On the contrary,
for type-(ii) time losses the eﬀect of the presence of children on the time/money tradeoﬀ
faced by two-adult households is either insigniﬁcant or slightly positive. Interestingly, in
two-adult households, in all cases where the time loss leads to two full-time working adults,
the time-money tradeoﬀ increases in the presence of each additional child. We provided
estimates of child costs relative to an adult as functions of household characteristics after
22controlling for household economies of scale in consumption along the dimension of household
size. These estimates suggest that relative child costs are higher for households that are
time-constrained (all adults in the household work). Moreover, we found evidence for the
potential for welfare gains from specialization in childcare vs. market activities in two-adult
households. We argued that modeling childcare explicitly in theoretical models and the
potential for specialization in domestic vs. market activities in two-adult households (two
working hypotheses in Apps and Rees (2002)) are plausible and also a promising direction for
future research. We have also suggested ways to combine our survey data with other available
databases and existing methodologies in applied research on labor and family economics.
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26         Table 1     Personal characteristics of respondents 
  Belgium Germany 
  N=149 N=164 
  N % N % 
Gender      
Female            69  46.3  56  34.1 
Male              80  53.7  108  65.9 
Partner      
Yes               109  73.2  69  42.1 
No                40  26.8  95  57.9 
Children      
None              80  53.7  140  85.4 
One               17  11.4  18  11.0 
Two               31  20.8  5  3.0 
More than two     21  14.1  1  0.6 
Siblings      
None              1  0.7  30  18.3 
One               10  6.7  51  31.1 
Two               69  46.3  57  34.8 
More than two     69  46.3  26  15.8 
Age      
< 20 years        1  0.7  0  0.0 
20 - 40 years     108  72.5  147  89.6 
> 40 years        40  26.8  17  10.4 
Education              
Unfinished education       0  0.0  1  0.6 
Element. school     1  0.7  1  0.6 
Second. school       10  6.7  3  1.8 
Special German second. School  ---  ---  2  1.2 
German second. School  ---  ---  98  59.8 
Techn. school or university  138  92.6  59  36.0 
Occupational group            
Social-sec. rec. or unemployed      1 0.7  1 0.6 
Blue-collar worker         3  2.0  1  0.6 
White-collar worker         118  79.2  45  27.4 
Civil servant                 11  7.4  8  4.8 
Pupil/student/trainee        12  8.1  102  62.4 
Self-employed               2  1.3  5  3.0 
Pensioner                     2  1.3  1  0.6 
Housewife/houseman            0  0.0  1  0.6 
Own working time           
Not working                  3  2.0  27  16.5 
Working irregularly           6  4.0  63  38.4 
Working 1/2 day      3  2.0  25  15.2 
Working 1/1 day       137  91.9  49  29.9 
Working time of partner             
Not working                51  34.2  117  71.3 
Working irregularly         0  0.0  6  3.7 
Working 1/2 day    17  11.4  12  7.3 
Working 1/1 day     81  54.4  29  17.7 
After-tax household income      
y_p < 1.75P              4  2.7  64  39.0 
1.75P ≤ y_p < 3.25P     36  24.2  46  28.0 
3.25P ≤ y_p < 4.75P      28  18.8  24  14.6 
4.75P ≤ y_p < 6.25P       41  27.5  18  11.0 
y_p ≥ 6.25P                40  26.8  12  7.4 
P denotes the social-assistance benefit for a single adult. 
          Table 2 – Average stated equivalent incomes (values in Euros) 
   Belgium    Germany 
yr n C N  W  NN  WN  WW  N  W  NN  WN  WW 







































































































































































































































Average equivalent incomes. Standard errors in parentheses (sample standard deviation divided by the square root of the number of observations). nC denotes the 
number of children; yr denotes the level of reference income; each N denotes a non-working adult, each W denotes a (full-time) working adult. 
  
Occupational -
status variation  W - N  WN - NN  WW - WN 
yr     nC =0  nC =1 nC =2 nC =3 nC =0  nC =1 nC =2 nC =3 nC =0  nC =1 nC =2 nC =3 
Mean  303.34 331.49 357.58 381.45 261.11  259.02  263.63 255.78 309.67  372.20 400.44 429.07 
Median  250.00 250.00 275.00 300.00 150.00  150.00  150.00 150.00 200.00  250.00 250.00 300.00 




            3.53
***              4.53
***      2.78
*** 
            [0.00]         [0.00]       [0.01] 
             0.50          0.77         0.39 
            [0.62]       [0.44]      [0.70] 
             5.41
***      3.18
***        4.01
***  
            [0.00]       [0.00]         [0.00] 
Mean  621.05 692.49 740.68 799.94 471.11  501.89  514.56 556.66 610.21  700.61 749.95 788.68 
Median  400.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 250.00  250.00  250.00 250.00 300.00  500.00 500.00 500.00 




            4.31
***         4.00
***     5.13
*** 
           [0.00]          [0.00]       [0.00] 
             1.93
*            0.73          2.69
*** 
            [0.05]      [0.46]       [0.01] 
             6.20
***      4.31
***          4.52
*** 
            [0.00]       [0.00]        [0.00] 
Mean  783.06  894.19  946.90 1021.98 708.19 707.77 696.90  722.42  862.36 981.95 1063.24  1130.31 
Median  500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 300.00  300.00  300.00 300.00 500.00  500.00 500.00 600.00 




            6.40
***             4.25
***          3.90
*** 
           [0.00]          [0.00]        [0.00] 
             0.76   
         0.94          0.28 
            [0.45]      [0.34]       [0.78] 
             5.67
***      5.16
***           5.15
*** 
            [0.00]       [0.00]         [0.00] 
Notes. yr denotes the reference income; nC denotes the number of children. Standard errors are given by the sample standard deviation divided by the square root of the number of observations. 
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; 
** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; 
* denotes significance at the 10 percent level; all other test statistics are insignificant. 
 
    Table 3a – Stated time-loss compensations (Belgium) 
  
Occupational - 
status variation  W - N  WN - NN  WW - WN 
yr     nC =0  nC =1 nC =2 nC =3 nC =0  nC =1 nC =2 nC =3 nC =0  nC =1 nC =2 nC =3 
Mean  403.35 425.76 425.21 435.64 337.20  337.87  343.78 355.47 401.52  466.62 505.03 542.83 
Median  312.50 350.00 350.00 350.00 250.00  250.00  250.00 250.00 250.00  300.00 325.00 350.00 




            2.26
**                0.64         1.24 
            [0.02]         [0.52]       [0.21] 
             0.97          0.91         0.67 
            [0.33]       [0.36]      [0.50] 
             7.01
***      5.14
***        4.92
***  
            [0.00]       [0.00]         [0.00] 
Mean  829.57 847.71 888.11 917.35 628.87  658.54  662.35 671.68 862.44  962.20  1038.35  1122.87 
Median  500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00 500.00  500.00  500.00 500.00 500.00  575.00 625.00 750.00 




            4.22
***         4.03
***     3.36
*** 
           [0.00]          [0.00]       [0.00] 
             2.96
***         1.23         1.83
* 
            [0.00]       [0.22]       [0.07] 
             7.27
***      5.68
***          5.88
*** 
            [0.00]       [0.00]        [0.00] 
Mean  1040.70  1123.78 1165.73  1212.50 858.38 943.32 966.34  988.60 1296.49  1382.16  1451.34 1518.29 
Median  500.00 700.00 725.00 750.00 500.00  500.00  500.00 500.00 875.00  1000.00  1000.00 1000.00 




            5.24
***             3.97
***          4.93
*** 
           [0.00]          [0.00]         [0.00] 
             3.97
***         2.28
**       2.70
*** 
             [0.00]       [0.02]      [0.01] 
             5.78
***      5.44
***           4.57
*** 
            [0.00]       [0.00]         [0.00] 
Notes.  yr denotes the reference income; nC denotes the number of children. Standard errors are given by the sample standard deviation divided by the square root of the number of observations. 
*** 
denotes significance at the 1 percent level; 
** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; 
* denotes significance at the 10 percent level; all other test statistics are insignificant. 
 
    Table 3b – Stated time-loss compensations (Germany) Belgium
 
yr y r = 500  yr = 2000
  yr = 3500
 
  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4 



























βy  W n   0.91*** 
(0.05) 
0.75*** 
(0.06)     0.64*** 
(0.05) 
0.51*** 
(0.06)     0.57*** 
(0.05) 
0.48*** 
(0.06)    
















δy  F C D n ⋅     0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.04)     0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.04)     0.07 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05)   
ζy  WN A D n ⋅      0.30*** 
(0.04) 
0.32*** 
(0.05)     0.17*** 
(0.03) 
0.18*** 




ηy  F A D n ⋅      0.74*** 
(0.06)      0.51*** 
(0.05)      0.48*** 
(0.06)   
φy  W C D n ⋅       0.10** 
(0.05)      0.10** 
(0.05)      0.07 
(0.06) 
χy 
WW C D n ⋅
 
    0.20** 
(0.09)      0.24** 
(0.11)      0.22* 
(0.12) 
ψy   W A D n ⋅       0.75*** 
(0.06)      0.48*** 
(0.07)      0.42*** 
(0.08) 
ωy  WW A D n ⋅       0.77*** 
(0.06)      0.51*** 




























R   0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Notes: Regressions for each reference income in Belgium. Endogenous variable: equivalence scales stated by respondents taking a childless 
non-working single adult as the reference household. Number of observations: 2831. White’s heteroskedasticity correction for covariance matrix; 
standard errors in parentheses; 
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; 
** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; 
* denotes significance 
at the 10 percent level; all other coefficients are insignificant. 
 






yr y r = 500  yr = 2000
  yr = 3500
 
  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4 



























βy  W n   0.95*** 
(0.04) 
0.82*** 
(0.05)     0.77*** 
(0.05) 
0.66*** 
(0.06)     0.68*** 
(0.04) 
0.59*** 
(0.05)    
















δy  F C D n ⋅     0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.08** 
(0.03)     0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.07* 
(0.04)     0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03)   
ζy  WN A D n ⋅      0.34*** 
(0.04) 
0.37*** 
(0.04)     0.24*** 
(0.04) 
0.27*** 




ηy  F A D n ⋅      0.81*** 
(0.05)      0.66*** 
(0.05)      0.58*** 
(0.05)   
φy  W C D n ⋅       0.09** 
(0.04)      0.07 
(0.05)      0.12*** 
(0.04) 
χy 
WW C D n ⋅
 
    0.18** 
(0.07)      0.20** 
(0.09)      0.30*** 
(0.11) 
ψy   W A D n ⋅       0.80*** 
(0.06)      0.62*** 
(0.07)      0.40*** 
(0.07) 
ωy  WW A D n ⋅       0.86*** 
(0.07)      0.70*** 




























R   0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Notes: Regressions for each reference income in Germany. Endogenous variable: equivalence scales stated by respondents taking a childless 
non-working single adult as the reference household. Number of observations: 3116. White’s heteroskedasticity correction for covariance matrix; 
standard errors in parentheses; 
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; 
** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; 
* denotes significance 
at the 10 percent level; all other coefficients are insignificant. 
 




 Spec. 4 
Belgium Germany 
Apps & Rees (2002)  yr 
WN WW WN WW WN (average income)  WW (average income) 
poor (500)  0.59 0.79 0.58 0.76 
middle (2000)  0.36 0.60 0.30 0.50 









Notes. yr is the level of reference income. 
a denotes a model specification without considering domestic production and parental 
childcare. 
b denotes a model specification considering domestic production and parental childcare. 
 










































































Couples, middle (  2000)



























































Singles, rich (  3500)
Figure 1.b  (Germany) Equivalent incomes as functions of non-market time endowments. 
Note to Figure 1: Dashed curves are the equivalent-income functions of the childless households, 
appearing at the bottom of each graph, shifted in a (piecewise) parallel way in order to stress 
















1. Purpose of the survey 
In general, different household types may have different income needs in order to attain a given 
living standard. These needs (measured in income amounts) may depend on the number of 
adults and children living in the household. Furthermore, household needs may vary with 
respect to the occupational status of the adults (non-working or working full time) since this 
might affect, for example, the time adults can spend for cooking or educating their children. 
Therefore, the following question arises:  
 
Given the income of a specific household type (reference household), what is the income for 
another household type (differing with respect to the number of children and/or adults and/or 
number of working adults) that allows this household to reach an identical living standard as 
the reference household? 
 
Since there does not exist an objectively correct answer, we would like to know your 
subjective assessment of this question.  
 
 
2. Personal characteristics 
 
We would like to ask you to state some of your own personal characteristics. Please mark the 
boxes that apply to you. Your answers will be treated confidentially and only for the stated 
research purpose. 
 
1)  Please state your gender:                male 
female 
 
2)  Are you living together with a partner?          yes 
no 
  
2a) In case your answer to question 2) is “yes:” 
 Is  your  partner    working       not  at  all 





3)  How many children are living in your household?      0 
1 
2 
3 or more 
 
4) What is your family after-tax income per month?                         below 1.75P
* 
           1.75P  –  3.25P 
           3.25P  –  4.75P 
                             4.75P – 6.25P 
           6.25P  and  above 
                                                            
* Note to researcher: P is the “poverty line” in a country as explained in the section explaining the survey 
structure.  



















7)  Please  state  your  education  level:     no  degree 
elementary school 
          s e c o n d a r y   s c h o o l  
          technical  school  or   
university 
 
8)  Please state the number of siblings you lived together with during 
your  childhood:         0 
           1  
           2  
           3   o r   m o r e  
 
 
9)  Please mark the correct age category you belong to:      below 20 years 
20 – 40 years 





3. Income evaluation 
In the tables below you shall evaluate three different situations. These situations differ by the pre-
specified after-tax monthly income (including all social transfers) of a household consisting of a 
non-working childless single adult. Now consider, for each situation separately, that the size and 
composition of the households change according to the table.  
 
Below, we give you an example of such a table. Please take some time to familiarize yourself 


















0 children  Reference 
income 
      
1 child 
 
       
2 children 
 
       
3 children 
 
       
 
Within a given table, all household types should attain the same living standard. You are 
asked to fill in the gaps putting the after-tax family income that you believe brings the 
households that differ with respect to the numbers of children, adults, and working adults, to 
the same living standard as the one of the non-working single-childless adult.  
 
Please complete the following three tables. Assume for your assessment that adults are 
between 35 and 55 and children between 7 and 11 years old. 
 
(In the actual survey, three tables are provided, with the same structure as above, each for a 
different reference income for the non-working single-childless adult in increasing order). 
 